<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . "Consciousness: explaining the phenomena."^^ . "Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an 'explanatory gap' between physical and/or intentional states and processes, on the one hand, and phenomenal consciousness, on the other. I reply that, since we have purely recognitional concepts of experience, there is indeed a sort of gap at the level of concepts; but this need not mean that the properties picked out by those concepts are inexplicable. I show how dispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theory can reductively explain the subjective feel of experience by deploying a form of 'consumer semantics'. First-order perceptual contents become transformed, acquiring a dimension of subjectivity, by virtue to their availability to a mind-reading (HOT generating) consumer system."^^ . "2002" . . . "Cambridge University Press"^^ . . . "Naturalism, Evolution and Mind."^^ . . . . . . . . . . . "Peter"^^ . "Carruthers"^^ . "Peter Carruthers"^^ . . "Denis"^^ . "Walsh"^^ . "Denis Walsh"^^ . . . . . . "Consciousness: explaining the phenomena. (HTML)"^^ . . . "Explaining-the-phenomena.htm"^^ . . . "Consciousness: explaining the phenomena. (Indexer Terms)"^^ . . . . . . "indexcodes.txt"^^ . . "HTML Summary of #2235 \n\nConsciousness: explaining the phenomena.\n\n" . "text/html" . . . "Cognitive Psychology" . . . "Philosophy of Mind" . .