TY  - GEN
ID  - cogprints2235
UR  - http://cogprints.org/2235/
A1  - Carruthers, Peter
Y1  - 2002///
N2  - Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an 'explanatory gap' between physical and/or intentional states and processes, on the one hand, and phenomenal consciousness, on the other. I reply that, since we have purely recognitional concepts of experience, there is indeed a sort of gap at the level of concepts; but this need not mean that the properties picked out by those concepts are inexplicable. I show how dispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theory can reductively explain the subjective feel of experience by deploying a form of 'consumer semantics'. First-order perceptual contents become transformed, acquiring a dimension of subjectivity, by virtue to their availability to a mind-reading (HOT generating) consumer system.
PB  - Cambridge University Press
KW  - phenomenal consciousness
higher-order experience
consciousness
higher-order thought
TI  - Consciousness: explaining the phenomena.
SP  - 61
AV  - public
EP  - 85
ER  -

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