@misc{cogprints244, editor = {S Hameroff and A Kaszniac and A Scott}, title = {Goodbye to Reductionism}, author = {Max Velmans}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1998}, pages = {45--52}, journal = {Toward a Science of Consciousness: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates}, keywords = {consciousness, dualism, reductionism, phenomenology, identity theory, perception, reflexive, projection, pain, body-image, Searle, Place, Churchland}, url = {http://cogprints.org/244/}, abstract = {To understand consciousness we must first describe what we experience accurately. But oddly, current dualist vs reductionist debates characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience. Indeed, there is no other area of enquiry where the phenomenon to be studied has been so systematically misdescribed. Given this, it is hardly surprising that progress towards understanding the nature of consciousness has been limited.} }