creators_name: Velmans, Max editors_name: Hameroff, S editors_name: Kaszniac, A editors_name: Scott, A type: bookchapter datestamp: 1998-03-13 lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:53:46 metadata_visibility: show title: Goodbye to Reductionism ispublished: pub subjects: cog-psy subjects: phil-metaphys subjects: phil-mind subjects: phil-sci subjects: physio-psy full_text_status: public keywords: consciousness, dualism, reductionism, phenomenology, identity theory, perception, reflexive, projection, pain, body-image, Searle, Place, Churchland abstract: To understand consciousness we must first describe what we experience accurately. But oddly, current dualist vs reductionist debates characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience. Indeed, there is no other area of enquiry where the phenomenon to be studied has been so systematically misdescribed. Given this, it is hardly surprising that progress towards understanding the nature of consciousness has been limited. date: 1998 date_type: published publication: Toward a Science of Consciousness: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates publisher: MIT Press pagerange: 45-52 refereed: TRUE citation: Velmans, Max (1998) Goodbye to Reductionism. [Book Chapter] document_url: http://cogprints.org/244/1/velmans7.html