@misc{cogprints246,
          volume = {2},
          number = {3},
           title = {The Relation of Consciousness to the Material World},
          author = {Max Velmans},
            year = {1995},
           pages = {255--265},
         journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
        keywords = {consciousness, Chalmers, dualism, reductionism, mind/body problem, dual-aspect, information, functionalism, complementarity, blindsight, cortical implant, qualia},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/246/},
        abstract = {Many of the arguments about how to address the hard versus the easy questions of consciousness put by Chalmers (1995) are similar to ones I have developed in Velmans (1991a,b; 1993a). This includes the multiplicity of mind/body problems, the limits of functional explanation, the need for a nonreductionist approach, and the notion that consciousness may be related to neural/physical representation via a dual-aspect theory of information. But there are also differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional accounts rather than the term "awareness." I do not agree that functional equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight. I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce a different form of dual-aspect theory involving "psychological complementarity." I also suggest that the hard problem posed by "qualia" has its origin in a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism.}
}

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