?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.title=The+Relation+of+Consciousness+to+the+Material+World&rft.creator=Velmans%2C+Max&rft.subject=Cognitive+Psychology&rft.subject=Epistemology&rft.subject=Philosophy+of+Mind&rft.subject=Philosophy+of+Science&rft.description=Many+of+the+arguments+about+how+to+address+the+hard+versus+the+easy+questions+of+consciousness+put+by+Chalmers+(1995)+are+similar+to+ones+I+have+developed+in+Velmans+(1991a%2Cb%3B+1993a).+This+includes+the+multiplicity+of+mind%2Fbody+problems%2C+the+limits+of+functional+explanation%2C+the+need+for+a+nonreductionist+approach%2C+and+the+notion+that+consciousness+may+be+related+to+neural%2Fphysical+representation+via+a+dual-aspect+theory+of+information.+But+there+are+also+differences.+Unlike+Chalmers+I+argue+for+the+use+of+neutral+information+processing+language+for+functional+accounts+rather+than+the+term+%22awareness.%22+I+do+not+agree+that+functional+equivalence+cannot+be+extricated+from+phenomenal+equivalence%2C+and+suggest+a+hypothetical+experiment+for+doing+so+-+using+a+cortical+implant+for+blindsight.+I+argue+that+not+all+information+has+phenomenal+accompaniments%2C+and+introduce+a+different+form+of+dual-aspect+theory+involving+%22psychological+complementarity.%22+I+also+suggest+that+the+hard+problem+posed+by+%22qualia%22+has+its+origin+in+a+misdescription+of+everyday+experience+implicit+in+dualism.&rft.date=1995&rft.type=Journal+(Paginated)&rft.type=PeerReviewed&rft.format=text%2Fhtml&rft.identifier=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F246%2F1%2Fvelman11.html&rft.identifier=++Velmans%2C+Max++(1995)+The+Relation+of+Consciousness+to+the+Material+World.++%5BJournal+(Paginated)%5D+++++&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F246%2F