TY  - GEN
ID  - cogprints246
UR  - http://cogprints.org/246/
A1  - Velmans, Max
Y1  - 1995///
N2  - Many of the arguments about how to address the hard versus the easy questions of consciousness put by Chalmers (1995) are similar to ones I have developed in Velmans (1991a,b; 1993a). This includes the multiplicity of mind/body problems, the limits of functional explanation, the need for a nonreductionist approach, and the notion that consciousness may be related to neural/physical representation via a dual-aspect theory of information. But there are also differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional accounts rather than the term "awareness." I do not agree that functional equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight. I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce a different form of dual-aspect theory involving "psychological complementarity." I also suggest that the hard problem posed by "qualia" has its origin in a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism.
KW  - consciousness
KW  -  Chalmers
KW  -  dualism
KW  -  reductionism
KW  -  mind/body problem
KW  -  dual-aspect
KW  -  information
KW  -  functionalism
KW  -  complementarity
KW  -  blindsight
KW  -  cortical implant
KW  -  qualia
TI  - The Relation of Consciousness to the Material World
SP  - 255
AV  - public
EP  - 265
ER  -

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