"246","The Relation of Consciousness to the Material World","Many of the arguments about how to address the hard versus the easy questions of consciousness put by Chalmers (1995) are similar to ones I have developed in Velmans (1991a,b; 1993a). This includes the multiplicity of mind/body problems, the limits of functional explanation, the need for a nonreductionist approach, and the notion that consciousness may be related to neural/physical representation via a dual-aspect theory of information. But there are also differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional accounts rather than the term \"awareness.\" I do not agree that functional equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight. I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce a different form of dual-aspect theory involving \"psychological complementarity.\" I also suggest that the hard problem posed by \"qualia\" has its origin in a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism.","http://cogprints.org/246/","Velmans, Max","UNSPECIFIED","       <span class=\"person_name\">Velmans, Max</span>     (1995)  <a href=\"http://cogprints.org/246/\"><em>The Relation of Consciousness to the Material World.</em></a>       [Journal (Paginated)]           ","","1995"