creators_name: Velmans, Max type: journalp datestamp: 1998-03-13 lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:53:46 metadata_visibility: show title: The Relation of Consciousness to the Material World ispublished: pub subjects: cog-psy subjects: phil-epist subjects: phil-mind subjects: phil-sci full_text_status: public keywords: consciousness, Chalmers, dualism, reductionism, mind/body problem, dual-aspect, information, functionalism, complementarity, blindsight, cortical implant, qualia abstract: Many of the arguments about how to address the hard versus the easy questions of consciousness put by Chalmers (1995) are similar to ones I have developed in Velmans (1991a,b; 1993a). This includes the multiplicity of mind/body problems, the limits of functional explanation, the need for a nonreductionist approach, and the notion that consciousness may be related to neural/physical representation via a dual-aspect theory of information. But there are also differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional accounts rather than the term "awareness." I do not agree that functional equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight. I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce a different form of dual-aspect theory involving "psychological complementarity." I also suggest that the hard problem posed by "qualia" has its origin in a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism. date: 1995 date_type: published publication: Journal of Consciousness Studies volume: 2 number: 3 pagerange: 255-265 refereed: TRUE citation: Velmans, Max (1995) The Relation of Consciousness to the Material World. [Journal (Paginated)] document_url: http://cogprints.org/246/1/velman11.html