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abstract: 'A "machine" is any causal physical system, hence we are machines, hence machines can be conscious. The question is: which kinds of machines can be conscious? Chances are that robots that can pass the Turing Test -- completely indistinguishable from us in their behavioral capacities -- can be conscious (i.e. feel), but we can never be sure (because of the "other-minds" problem). And we can never know HOW they have minds, because of the "mind/body" problem. We can only know how they pass the Turing Test, but not how, why or whether that makes them feel.'
altloc:
  - http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/machine.htm
chapter: ~
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creators_id:
  - 63
creators_name:
  - family: Harnad
    given: Stevan
    honourific: ''
    lineage: ''
date: 2003
date_type: published
datestamp: 2002-09-15
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dir: disk0/00/00/24/60
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eprintid: 2460
fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/2460/1/machine.htm
full_text_status: public
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keywords: 'artificial intelligence, consciousness, Turing Test, mind/body problem, other-mind problem, artificial life'
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:00
latitude: ~
longitude: ~
metadata_visibility: show
note: ~
number: 4-5
pagerange: 69-75
pubdom: FALSE
publication: Journal of Consciousness Studies
publisher: ~
refereed: TRUE
referencetext: |-
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  Cangelosi, A. & Harnad, S. (2001) The Adaptive Advantage of Symbolic Theft Over Sensorimotor Toil:Grounding Language in Perceptual      Categories. Evolution of Communication 4(1) 117-142
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/20/36/index.html
  
  Cangelosi A., Greco A. & Harnad S. (2000). From robotic toil to symbolic theft: Grounding transfer from entry-level to higher-level categories. Connection Science12(2):143-162 http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/47/index.html
  
   
  Harnad, S. (1982) Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory 5: 29 - 47. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/70/index.html
  
  Harnad, S. (1990) The Symbol Grounding Problem Physica D 42: 335-346. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/06/15/index.html
  
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  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/78/index.html
  
  Harnad, S. (1992) The Turing Test Is Not A Trick: Turing Indistinguishability Is A Scientific Criterion. SIGART Bulletin 3(4) (October1992) pp. 9 - 10.
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/84/index.html
  
  Harnad, S. (1994) Levels of Functional Equivalence in Reverse Bioengineering: The Darwinian Turing Test for Artificial Life. Artificial Life
  
  1(3): 293-301. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/91/index.html
  
  Harnad, Stevan (1995) "Why and How We Are Not Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:164-167 http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/01/index.html
  
  Harnad, S. (2000) Minds, Machines, and Turing: The Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9(4): 425-445. (special issue on "Alan Turing and Artificial Intelligence") http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/16/index.html
  
  Harnad, S. (2001) No Easy Way Out. The Sciences 41(2) 36-42. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/24/index.html
  
  Harnad, S. (2002) Turing Indistinguishability and the Blind Watchmaker. In: J. Fetzer (ed.) Evolving Consciousness Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Pp 3-18 http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/15/index.html
  
  Premack, D. & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 4, 515-526.
  
  Shear, J. (Ed.) (1997) Explaining consciousness : the "hard problem." Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1997.
  
  Turing, A. M. (1950) Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind 49:433-460. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/99/index.html
  
  Whiten, A. (Ed.) (1991). Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development, and simulation of  everyday mindreading . Oxford: Blackwell.
relation_type: []
relation_uri: []
reportno: ~
rev_number: 8
series: ~
source: ~
status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:44:58
subjects:
  - neuro-mod
  - cog-psy
  - phil-mind
  - comp-sci-robot
  - bio-theory
succeeds: ~
suggestions: ~
sword_depositor: ~
sword_slug: ~
thesistype: ~
title: "Can a machine be conscious? How?\n"
type: journalp
userid: 63
volume: 10
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