@misc{cogprints251,
          volume = {XLVIII},
           month = {December},
           title = {Commentary on Cam},
          author = {Daniel C. Dennett},
            year = {1987},
           pages = {339--41},
         journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/251/},
        abstract = {In "Propositions about Images" Philip Cam accurately analyzes and criticizes the grounds I gave, in the works he cites, for my denial that we have privileged access (of any sort) to anything deserving to be called a mental image. He shows that I did not deal properly with the question of how I would interpret the ostensive force of "this" and "that" in an introspective judgment of the sort: "Now it looks like this and now it looks like that." What can one be ostending or referring to in such a case, if not to an image (or some feature of an image)?}
}

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