creators_name: Velmans, Max
type: journalp
datestamp: 2003-02-25
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:13
metadata_visibility: show
title: IS THE WORLD IN THE BRAIN, OR THE BRAIN IN THE WORLD? 
(A commentary on Lehar, S. Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: A Gestalt Bubble model, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in press) 

ispublished: inpress
subjects: neuro-psy
subjects: neuro-mod
subjects: phil-mind
full_text_status: public
keywords: Lehar, biological naturalism, reflexive monism, visual perception, brain, phenomenal world, spatial
note: This is a fuller (unabridged) version of an invited commentary on a BBS target article.
abstract: Lehar provides useful insights into spatially extended phenomenology that may have major consequences for neuroscience.  However, Lehar’s biological naturalism leads to counterintuitive conclusions and he does not give an accurate account of preceding and competing work.  This commentary compares Lehar’s analysis with that of Velmans, which address similar issues but draws opposite conclusions. Lehar argues that the phenomenal world is in the brain, and concludes that the physical skull is beyond the phenomenal world. Velmans argues that the brain is in the phenomenal world and concludes that the physical skull is where it seems to be.  
date: 2003
date_type: published
publication: In press
refereed: TRUE
referencetext: James, W (1904) Does 'consciousness' exist?  Reprinted in: G. N. A. Vesey (ed) Body and mind:  readings in philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970, pp 202-208.

Pribram, K.H. (1971) Languages of the brain: experimental paradoxes and principles in neuropsychology. New York: Brandon House.
 
Revonsuo, A. (1995) Consciousness, dreams, and virtual realities.  Philosophical Psychology, 8(1): 35-58.

Velmans, M (2003) Is the world in the brain, or the brain in the world? (Unabridged version of BBS commentary).

Velmans, M. (2002a) How could conscious experiences affect brains? (Target Article for Special Issue) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9 (11): 3-29. 


Velmans, M (2002b) Making sense of the causal interactions between consciousness and brain (a reply to commentaries) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9 (11): 69-95.

Velmans, M. (2001) A natural account of phenomenal consciousness.  Communication and Cognition, 34(1&2): 39-59.
 

Velmans, M. (2000a) Understanding Consciousness, London: Routledge/Psychology Press.

Velmans, M. (ed.) (2000b) Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Velmans, M. (1996a) Consciousness and the “causal paradox.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19(3): 537-542. 


Velmans, M (ed) (1996b) The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological and Clinical Reviews. London: Routledge.

Velmans, M.(1993) A Reflexive Science of consciousness.  In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Wiley, Chichester, pp 81-99. 

Velmans, M. (1991a) Is human information processing conscious? (Target Article) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4): 651-669. 
 

Velmans, M. (1991b) Consciousness from a first-person perspective.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4): 702-726. 


Velmans, M. (1990) Consciousness, brain, and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology: 3, 77-99. 




citation:   Velmans, Professor Max  (2003) IS THE WORLD IN THE BRAIN, OR THE BRAIN IN THE WORLD? (A commentary on Lehar, S. Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: A Gestalt Bubble model, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in press).  [Journal (Paginated)]    (In Press)  
document_url: http://cogprints.org/2798/1/Lehar-Velmans_Commentary%28cogprints%29.htm