---
abstract: 'Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not evaluative considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people’s concept of intentional action.'
altloc:
- http://www.princeton.edu/~jknobe/IntentionSkill.pdf
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creators_name:
- family: Knobe
given: Joshua
honourific: ''
lineage: ''
date: 2003
date_type: published
datestamp: 2003-05-06
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editors_id: []
editors_name:
- family: Bechtel
given: William
honourific: ''
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eprint_status: archive
eprintid: 2922
fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/2922/1/IntentionSkill.pdf
full_text_status: public
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keywords: 'Intentional Action, Action Theory, Folk Morality, Folk Psychology, Intention'
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:16
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publication: Philosophical Psychology
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refereed: TRUE
referencetext: |
ASTINGTON, J. W. (1999). The language of intention: Three ways of doing it. In P. D. ZELAZO, J. W. ASTINGTON, AND D. R. OLSON (Eds), Developing theories of intention. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
ASTINGTON, J. W. (2001). The paradox of intention: Assessing children’s metarepresentational understanding. In B. F., MALLE, L. J. MOSES, & D. BALDWIN (Eds), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition. Cambridge, MA: M. I. T. Press.
BRATMAN, M. E. (1987). Intention, plans, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
CHURCHLAND, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67-90.
CHURCHLAND, P. M. (1991). Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior. In J. GREENWOOD (Ed.), The future of folk psychology: Intentionality and cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
GOPNIK, A., & WELLMAN, H. M. (1992). Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory. Mind and Language, 7, 145-171.
GOPNIK, A., & MELTZOFF, A. (1997). Words, Thoughts and Theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
HARMAN, G. (1976). Practical reasoning. Review of Metaphysics, 29, 431-463.
LOWE, E. J. (1978). Neither intentional nor unintentional. Analysis, 38, 117-118.
MALLE, B. F. & KNOBE, J. (1997a). The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33: 101-121.
MALLE, B. F. & KNOBE, J. (1997b). Which behaviors do people explain? A basic actor-observer asymmetry. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 288-304.
MALLE, B. F., KNOBE, J, O’LAUGHLIN, M. J., PEARCE, G. E., & NELSON, S. E. (2000). Conceptual structure and social functions of behavior explanations: Beyond person-situation attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 309-326.
MELE, A. (2001). Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions. In B. F., MALLE, L. J. MOSES, & D. BALDWIN (Eds), Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition. Cambridge, MA: M. I. T. Press.
MELE, A. R. & MOSER, P. K. (1994). Intentional action. Nous, 28, 39-68.
MELE, A. R. & SVERDLIK, S. (1996). Intention, intentional action, and moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 82, 265-287.
PITCHER, G. (1970). ‘In intending’ and side effects. Journal of Philosophy, 67, 659-668.
SHAVER, K. (1985). The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility and blameworthiness. New York: Springer.
WILKES, K. (1981). Functionalism, psychology, and the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Topics, 12, 1.
YOUNG, M. (2001). ‘It’s the thought that counts’: The role of perceived intention in making event explanations. MS. Stanford University.
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rev_number: 12
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status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:47:31
subjects:
- phil-mind
- phil-ethics
- soc-psy
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title: 'Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation'
type: journale
userid: 4031
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