@misc{cogprints324, volume = {9}, number = {4}, title = {The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of cognition}, author = {Chris Eliasmith}, year = {1996}, pages = {441--463}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Psychology}, keywords = {cognitive science, cognitive theories, dynamical systems, connectionism, dynamicism, symbolicism, theories of mind, neural nets, artificial intelligence, cognition, van Gelder}, url = {http://cogprints.org/324/}, abstract = {In a recent series of publications, dynamicist researchers have proposed a new conception of cognitive functioning. This conception is intended to replace the currently dominant theories of connectionism and symbolicism. The dynamicist approach to cognitive modeling employs concepts developed in the mathematical field of dynamical systems theory. They claim that cognitive models should be embedded, low-dimensional, complex, described by coupled differential equations, and non-representational. In this paper I begin with a short description of the dynamicist project and its role as a cognitive theory. Subsequently, I determine the theoretical commitments of dynamicists, critically examine those commitments and discuss current examples of dynamicist models. In conclusion, I determine dynamicism's relation to symbolicism and connectionism and find that the dynamicist goal to establish a new paradigm has yet to be realized.} }