@misc{cogprints3254,
          volume = {13},
           month = {September},
           title = {Psychosemantic analyticity},
          author = {Richard Horsey},
            year = {2001},
         journal = {UCL Working Papers in Linguistics},
        keywords = {logical vocabulary
analyticity},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/3254/},
        abstract = {It is widely agreed that the content of a logical concept such as and is constituted by the inferences it enters into. I argue that it is impossible to draw a principled distinction between logical and non-logical concepts, and hence that the content of non-logical concepts can also be constituted by certain of their inferential relations.

The traditional problem with such a view has been that, given Quine?s arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction, there does not seem to be any way to distinguish between those inferences that are content constitutive and those that are not. I propose that such a distinction can be drawn by appealing to a notion of ?psychosemantic analyticity?. This approach is immune to Quine?s arguments, since ?psychosemantic analyticity? is a psychological property, and it is thus an empirical question which inferences have this property.

}
}

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