"3254","Psychosemantic analyticity","It is widely agreed that the content of a logical concept such as and is constituted by the inferences it enters into. I argue that it is impossible to draw a principled distinction between logical and non-logical concepts, and hence that the content of non-logical concepts can also be constituted by certain of their inferential relations.  The traditional problem with such a view has been that, given Quine’s arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction, there does not seem to be any way to distinguish between those inferences that are content constitutive and those that are not. I propose that such a distinction can be drawn by appealing to a notion of ‘psychosemantic analyticity’. This approach is immune to Quine’s arguments, since ‘psychosemantic analyticity’ is a psychological property, and it is thus an empirical question which inferences have this property.  ","http://cogprints.org/3254/","Horsey, Richard","UNSPECIFIED","       <span class=\"person_name\">Horsey, Richard</span>     (2001)  <a href=\"http://cogprints.org/3254/\"><em>Psychosemantic analyticity.</em></a>       [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)]           ","","2001-09"
<script src='//archive-bar.soton.ac.uk/archive-bar.js'></script>