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--- abstract: |+ It is widely agreed that the content of a logical concept such as and is constituted by the inferences it enters into. I argue that it is impossible to draw a principled distinction between logical and non-logical concepts, and hence that the content of non-logical concepts can also be constituted by certain of their inferential relations. The traditional problem with such a view has been that, given Quine’s arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction, there does not seem to be any way to distinguish between those inferences that are content constitutive and those that are not. I propose that such a distinction can be drawn by appealing to a notion of ‘psychosemantic analyticity’. This approach is immune to Quine’s arguments, since ‘psychosemantic analyticity’ is a psychological property, and it is thus an empirical question which inferences have this property. altloc: - http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/richardh/analytic.pdf chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Horsey given: Richard honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 2001-09 date_type: published datestamp: 2003-10-29 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/32/54 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 3254 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/3254/1/analytic.pdf full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: "logical vocabulary\nanalyticity" lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:23 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: ~ pubdom: FALSE publication: UCL Working Papers in Linguistics publisher: ~ refereed: FALSE referencetext: |- Block, N. (1993) Holism, Hyper-analyticity and hyper-compositionality. Mind and Language, 8: 1–26. Boghossian, P. A. (1993) Does an inferential role semantics rest upon a mistake? Mind and Language, 8: 27–40. Boghossian, P. A. (1994) Inferential role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Philosophical Studies, 73: 109–122. Boghossian, P. A. (1997) Analyticity. In B. Hale & C. Wright (eds) A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 331–368. Oxford: Blackwell. Fodor, J. A. (1975) The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell. Fodor, J. A. (1987) Psychosemantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Fodor, J. A. (1994) The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Fodor, J. A., M. F. Garrett, E. C. T. Walker & C. H. Parkes (1980) Against definitions. Cognition, 8: 263–367. Fodor, J. A. & E. Lepore (1991) Why meaning (probably) isn’t conceptual role. Mind and Language, 6: 328–343. Horwich, P. (1992) Chomsky versus Quine on the analytic–synthetic distinction. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92: 95–108. Horwich, P. (1998) Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Quine, W. V. O. (1935/1966) Truth by convention. In Quine 1966: 77–106. Quine, W. V. O. (1953) Two dogmas of empiricism. In From a Logical Point of View, 20–46. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Quine, W. V. O. (1954/1966) Carnap and logical truth. In Quine 1966: 107–132. Quine, W. V. O. (1966) The Ways of Paradox. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1995) Relevance, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell. relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 12 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:49:31 subjects: - phil-mind - phil-logic - ling-prag succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: Psychosemantic analyticity type: journale userid: 1857 volume: 13