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--- abstract: 'The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational modles is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type- type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that none of these kinds of evidence can be relevant to a choice among competing models unless there are in fact type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states. Thus, I conclude, research into the computational procedures employed in human cognition must be conducted hand-in-hand with research into the brain processes which realize those procedures.' altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Buller given: David J. honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 1993 date_type: published datestamp: 1998-06-18 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/03/27 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 327 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/327/1/confirm.htm full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'confirmation, computational models, weak/strong equivalence, token/type physicalism, relevant evidence, relative complexity evidence, processing time measures, verbal reports' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:53:49 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: 155-181 pubdom: FALSE publication: Minds and Machines publisher: ~ refereed: TRUE referencetext: ~ relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:26:39 subjects: - cog-psy - comp-sci-art-intel - phil-mind - phil-sci succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: 'Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm (or: Why Do You Think They Call It Artifical Intelligence?)' type: journalp userid: 206 volume: 3