@misc{cogprints354,
          volume = {20},
          number = {1},
           title = {On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties},
          author = {Guven Guzeldere and Murat Aydede},
            year = {1997},
           pages = {151--153},
         journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/354/},
        abstract = {This is a commentary on Block' article article, "On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness," BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that Block{\~O}s charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.}
}

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