%A Guven Guzeldere
%A Murat Aydede
%J Behavioral and Brain Sciences
%T On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties
%X This is a commentary on Block' article article, "On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness," BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that Block?s charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.
%N 1
%P 151-153
%V 20
%D 1997
%L cogprints354

<script src='https://archive-bar.soton.ac.uk/archive-bar.js'></script>
<script src='https://archive-bar.soton.ac.uk/google-analytics.js'></script>