"354","On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties","This is a commentary on Block' article article, \"On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness,\" BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that BlockÕs charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of \"phenomenal properties\" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.","http://cogprints.org/354/","Guzeldere, Guven and Aydede, Murat","UNSPECIFIED","       <span class=\"person_name\">Guzeldere, Guven</span> and <span class=\"person_name\">Aydede, Murat</span>     (1997)  <a href=\"http://cogprints.org/354/\"><em>On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties.</em></a>       [Journal (Paginated)]           ","","1997"
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