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--- abstract: "From a cognitive perspective, intentional communication may be viewed as an agent's activity overtly aimed at modifying a partner's mental states. According to standard Gricean definitions, this requires each party to be able to ascribe mental states to the other, i.e., to entertain a so-called theory of mind. According to the relevant experimental literature, however, such capability does not appear before the third or fourth birthday; it would follow that children under that age should not be viewed as communicating agents. In order to solve the resulting dilemma, we propose that certain specific components of an agent's cognitive architecture (namely, a peculiar version of sharedness and communicative intention), are necessary and sufficient to explain infant communication in a mentalist framework. We also argue that these components are innate in the human species.\n" altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: 'August 1-4, 1998' conference: 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society confloc: 'Madison, WI (USA)' contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Bosco given: Francesca M. honourific: '' lineage: '' - family: Tirassa given: Maurizio honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 1998 date_type: published datestamp: 2004-04-14 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/35/59 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: - family: Gernsbacher given: M.A. honourific: '' lineage: '' - family: Derry given: S.J. honourific: '' lineage: '' eprint_status: archive eprintid: 3559 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/3559/1/1998%2DMindreading.pdf full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: Mindreading; Communication; Nativism; Development; Shared mental states; Agency lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:31 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: 162-166 pubdom: FALSE publication: ~ publisher: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates refereed: TRUE referencetext: |- Airenti, G. 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Psychological Review 20: 158-177. ls relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 12 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:51:41 subjects: - dev-psy - cog-psy succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: Sharedness as an innate basis for communication in the infant type: confpaper userid: 3628 volume: ~