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    <abstract>Goedel&apos;s theorem states that in any consistent system which is strong enough to produce simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved-in-the-system, but which we can see to be true. Essentially, we consider the formula which says, in effect, &quot;This formula is unprovable-in-the-system&quot;. If this formula were provable-in-the-system, we should have a contradiction: for if it were provablein-the-system, then it would not be unprovable-in-the-system, so that &quot;This formula is unprovable-in-the-system&quot; would be false: equally, if it were provable-in-the-system, then it would not be false, but would be true, since in any consistent system nothing false can be provedin-the-system, but only truths. So the formula &quot;This formula is unprovable-in-the-system&quot; is not provable-in-the-system, but unprovablein-the-system. Further, if the formula &quot;This formula is unprovablein- the-system&quot; is unprovable-in-the-system, then it is true that that formula is unprovable-in-the-system, that is, &quot;This formula is unprovable-in-the-system&quot; is true. Goedel&apos;s theorem must apply to cybernetical machines, because it is of the essence of being a machine, that it should be a concrete instantiation of a formal system. It follows that given any machine which is consistent and capable of doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula which it is incapable of producing as being true---i.e., the formula is unprovable-in-the-system-but which we can see to be true. It follows that no machine can be a complete or adequate model of the mind, that minds are essentially different from machines.</abstract>
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        <name>
          <family>Lucas</family>
          <given>J.R.</given>
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    <keywords>goedel&apos;s theorem, computation, computability, symbolsystems, computationalism, cognitivism, machines, mind, provability, mental models, Penrose, Searle</keywords>
    <pagerange>112-127</pagerange>
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    <publication>Philosophy</publication>
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      <item>comp-sci-art-intel</item>
      <item>phil-logic</item>
      <item>phil-mind</item>
      <item>phil-sci</item>
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    <title>Minds, Machines and Goedel</title>
    <volume>36</volume>
    <date_type>published</date_type>
    <date>1961</date>
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