@misc{cogprints3579, volume = {22}, author = {Maurizio Tirassa}, note = {This paper is copyright of the author and of Cambridge University Press. Available with kind permission of Cambridge University Press. t}, title = {Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism }, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, pages = {851--852}, year = {1999}, keywords = {Cognitive science; Computational psychology; Mind as biology; Ontology of the mind;{\"a}}, url = {http://cogprints.org/3579/}, abstract = {Gold \& Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G\&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified. } }