@misc{cogprints3579,
          volume = {22},
          author = {Maurizio Tirassa},
            note = {This paper is copyright of the author and of Cambridge University Press. Available with kind permission of Cambridge University Press.
 t},
           title = {Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism
},
       publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
         journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
           pages = {851--852},
            year = {1999},
        keywords = {Cognitive science; Computational psychology; Mind as biology; Ontology of the mind;{\"a}},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/3579/},
        abstract = {Gold \& Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G\&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified.
}
}

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