title: Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism 
creator: Tirassa, Maurizio
subject: Cognitive Psychology
subject: Philosophy of Mind
subject: Behavioral & Brain Sciences
subject: Theoretical Biology
description: Gold & Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified. 
publisher: Cambridge University Press
date: 1999
type: Journal (Paginated)
type: PeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
identifier: http://cogprints.org/3579/1/1999-ReGoldStoljar.pdf
identifier:   Tirassa, Maurizio  (1999) Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism.  [Journal (Paginated)]     
relation: http://cogprints.org/3579/