TY  - GEN
N1  - This paper is copyright of the author and of Cambridge University Press. Available with kind permission of Cambridge University Press.
 t
ID  - cogprints3579
UR  - http://cogprints.org/3579/
A1  - Tirassa, Maurizio
Y1  - 1999///
N2  - Gold & Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified.

PB  - Cambridge University Press
KW  - Cognitive science; Computational psychology; Mind as biology; Ontology of the mind;ä
TI  - Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism

SP  - 851
AV  - public
EP  - 852
ER  -

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