TY - GEN N1 - This paper is copyright of the author and of Cambridge University Press. Available with kind permission of Cambridge University Press. t ID - cogprints3579 UR - http://cogprints.org/3579/ A1 - Tirassa, Maurizio Y1 - 1999/// N2 - Gold & Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified. PB - Cambridge University Press KW - Cognitive science; Computational psychology; Mind as biology; Ontology of the mind; TI - Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism SP - 851 AV - public EP - 852 ER -