%A Maurizio Tirassa
%O This paper is copyright of the author and of Cambridge University Press. Available with kind permission of Cambridge University Press.
 t
%J Behavioral and Brain Sciences
%T Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism

%X Gold & Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified.

%K Cognitive science; Computational psychology; Mind as biology; Ontology of the mind;?
%P 851-852
%V 22
%D 1999
%I Cambridge University Press
%L cogprints3579

<script src='https://archive-bar.soton.ac.uk/archive-bar.js'></script>
<script src='https://archive-bar.soton.ac.uk/google-analytics.js'></script>