%A Maurizio Tirassa %O This paper is copyright of the author and of Cambridge University Press. Available with kind permission of Cambridge University Press. t %J Behavioral and Brain Sciences %T Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism %X Gold & Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified. %K Cognitive science; Computational psychology; Mind as biology; Ontology of the mind;? %P 851-852 %V 22 %D 1999 %I Cambridge University Press %L cogprints3579