creators_name: Tirassa, Maurizio
type: journalp
datestamp: 2004-04-28
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:31
metadata_visibility: show
title: Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism

ispublished: pub
subjects: cog-psy
subjects: phil-mind
subjects: BBS
subjects: bio-theory
full_text_status: public
keywords: Cognitive science; Computational psychology; Mind as biology; Ontology of the mind;ä
note: This paper is copyright of the author and of Cambridge University Press. Available with kind permission of Cambridge University Press.
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abstract: Gold & Stoljar's characterization of the trivial doctrine and of its relationships with the radical one misses some differences that may be crucial. The radical doctrine can be read as a derivative of the computational version of functionalism that provides the backbone of current cognitive science and is fundamentally uninterested in biology: both doctrines are fundamentally wrong. The synthesis between neurobiology and psychology requires instead that minds be viewed as ontologically primitive, that is, as material properties of functioning bodies. G&S's characterization of the trivial doctrine should therefore be correspondingly modified.

date: 1999
date_type: published
publication: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
volume: 22
publisher: Cambridge University Press
pagerange: 851-852
refereed: TRUE
referencetext: Gold, I., Stoljar, D. (1999) A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 809-869.
Higginbotham, J. (1990) Philosophical issues in the study of language. In: Language: an invitation to cognitive science, eds. D.N. Osherson & H. Laznik. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

citation:   Tirassa, Maurizio  (1999) Taking the trivial doctrine seriously: Functionalism, eliminativism, and materialism.  [Journal (Paginated)]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/3579/1/1999-ReGoldStoljar.pdf