@misc{cogprints374,
          volume = {63},
           title = {Can colour be reduced to anything?},
          author = {Don Dedrick},
            year = {1996},
           pages = {134--142},
         journal = {Philosophy of Science Association 96 Supplementary Issue, Part I},
        keywords = {colour, reduction, Hardin, Matthen, chromatic subjectivism, chromatic objectivism.},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/374/},
        abstract = {C. L. Hardin has argued that the colour opponency of the vision system leads to chromatic subjectivism: chromatic sensory states reduce to neurophysiological states. Much of the force of Hardin's argument derives from a critique of chromatic objectivism. On this view chromatic sensory states are held to reduce to an external property. While I agree with Hardin's critique of objectivism it is far from clear that the problems which beset objectivism do not apply to the subjectivist position as well. I develop a critique of subjectivism that parallels Hardin's anti-objectivist argument.}
}

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