---
abstract: |-
In this commentaryI evaluate the claim made byKeenan, Nelson, OConnor, and
Pascual-Leone (2001) that since self-recognition results from right hemispheric activity,
self-awareness too is likely to be produced by the activity of the same hemisphere.
This reasoning is based on the assumption that self-recognition represents a
valid operationalization of self-awareness; I present two views that challenge this
rationale. Keenan et al. also support their claim with published evidence relating
brain activityand self-awareness; I closely examine their analysis of one specific
review of literature and conclude that it appears to be biased. Finally, recent research
suggests that inner speech (which is associated with left hemispheric activity) is
linked to self-awareness—an observation that further casts doubt on the existence of
a right hemispheric self-awareness.
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given: Alain
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date: 2002
date_type: published
datestamp: 2004-09-03
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keywords: 'Self-awareness, self-recognition, neuroanatomy, split-brain, inner speech, right hemisphere'
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:40
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number: 3
pagerange: 396-401
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publication: Consciousness and Cognition
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refereed: TRUE
referencetext: |-
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A. Morin / Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002) 396–401 401
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rev_number: 12
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status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:53:33
subjects:
- neuro-psy
- brain-img
- comp-psy
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- evol-psy
- neuro-anat
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title: 'Right hemispheric self-awareness: A critical assessment'
type: journalp
userid: 3466
volume: 11