This site has been permanently archived. This is a static copy provided by the University of Southampton.
TY - GEN ID - cogprints383 UR - http://cogprints.org/383/ A1 - MacLennan, Bruce J. Y1 - 1994/11// N2 - The central claim of computationalism is generally taken to be that the brain is a computer, and that any computer implementing the appropriate program would ipso facto have a mind. In this paper I argue for the following propositions: (1) The central claim of computationalism is not about computers, a concept too imprecise for a scientific claim of this sort, but is about physical calculi (instantiated discrete formal systems). (2) In matters of formality, interpretability, and so forth, analog computation and digital computation are not essentially different, and so arguments such as Searle's hold or not as well for one as for the other. (3) Whether or not a biological system (such as the brain) is computational is a scientific matter of fact. (4) A substantive scientific question for cognitive science is whether cognition is better modeled by discrete representations or by continuous representations. (5) Cognitive science and AI need a theoretical construct that is the continuous analog of a calculus. The discussion of these propositions will illuminate several terminology traps, in which it's all too easy to become ensnared. KW - computationalism KW - computation KW - analogue computation KW - analog computation KW - continuous computation KW - formality KW - digital computation KW - calculus KW - interpretation KW - Searle KW - Chinese room KW - symbol grounding KW - analogy KW - discrete versus continuous KW - formal system KW - dynamical system KW - continuous process KW - realization KW - implementation KW - program KW - universal computation KW - universal Turing machine KW - syntax KW - semantics KW - representation KW - systematicity KW - intentionality KW - synthetic ethology KW - Harnad KW - total Turing test TI - Words Lie in our Way SP - 421 AV - public EP - 437 ER -