--- abstract: 'Consciousness has resisted scientific explanation for centuries. The main problem in explaining consciousness is its subjectivity. Subjective systems may be adaptive. Humans can produce voluntary new or novel intentional (adaptive) action and such action is always accompanied by consciousness. Action normally arises from perception. Perception must be rerepresented in order to produce new or novel adaptive action. The internal explicit states produced by a widespread nonlinear emergent mechanism from perception have all the same properties as consciousness. Hence they may be identical to consciousness. Consciousness is natural, material, and functional; utilized in the production of adaptive action. ' altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Sieb given: Richard/A. honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 2005-02 date_type: published datestamp: 2005-02-26 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/39/08 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 3908 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/3908/1/Docum.html full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: ~ issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'adaptive action, consciousness, nonlinear emergence, explicit, positive feedback, voluntary, intentional, subjective' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:43 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: 'This article is a further development of material published in a former article "The Emergence Of Consciousness" published in Medical Hyptheses (2004)63(5),900-904.' number: ~ pagerange: ~ pubdom: FALSE publication: ~ publisher: ~ refereed: FALSE referencetext: |- References Alter, T. 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Nature 428:748-751. relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:54:16 subjects: - physio-psy - phil-mind - neuro-physio - behav-neuro-sci succeeds: ~ suggestions: 'The basic framework of this article has been refereed for publication in Medical Hypotheses ("The Emergence Of Consciousness", Medical Hypotheses (2004)63(5),900-904). This paper is a novel interpretation and synthesis of existing experimental and theoretical work on consciousness and voluntary behavioral control. Science is faced with two controversial issues: explaining consciousness and the production of voluntary new or novel intentional (adaptive) action. The two, however, always occur together and the same mechanism may encompass both. In this paper, a widespread nonlinear emergent mechanism is used to explain the production of voluntary new or novel intentional action. In doing so, consciousness is also explained. For centuries people have been trying to explain consciousness. However, no explanation captures the true essence of consciousness-its subjectivity (phenomenology). What is subjectivity? How can it arise from the neural substrate of the brain? How can it have physical effects? How and why did it evolve? These are all questions that have resisted scientific explanation (the mind/brain problem) and have led to the creation of much controversy and many diverse schools of thought on the subject. This paper provides plausible answers to these questions based on current scientific knowledge. It embraces the controversial issues concerning consciousness. It suggests that consciousness is not some mysterious nonmaterial epiphenomenon that cannot be explained scientifically, but is a natural material functional state that enables us to interact in a rapid, versatile, and purposeful way with our dynamic environment. This is highly adaptive and may have evolved for such a purpose. ' sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: Consciousness And Adaptive Behavior type: preprint userid: 3673 volume: ~