--- abstract: 'The Knowledge argument based on the grey Mary thought experiment cannot be claimed as a basis for rejecting physicalism. First, because it is flawed, being so formulated as to predetermine the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. Second, because, once this is recognised, it becomes clear that there is one - and only one - account of the qualia-physical relationship that will permit physicalism to survive the thought experiment itself. It is suggested that the position in question is worthy of further consideration as a reasonable candidate theory for a physicalist account of qualia.' altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Nicholson given: D.M. honourific: Mr lineage: '' date: 2005-01 date_type: published datestamp: 2005-01-08 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/40/20 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 4020 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/4020/1/KAMBPFPweb.htm full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: ~ issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'Knowledge argument, physicalism, qualia, mind-body problem, Identity theory, hard problem of consciousness, Kripke, Leibniz’s law' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:55:49 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: ~ pubdom: FALSE publication: ~ publisher: ~ refereed: FALSE referencetext: |+ Alter, T. 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Retrieved March 9, 2004 from http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/knowledgeargument.html relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:55:06 subjects: - phil-mind succeeds: 2951 suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia type: preprint userid: 1479 volume: ~