---
abstract: 'The aim of the paper is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean notion of a proposition, a notion I take for granted. A salient feature of Fregean propositions, i.e. complexes of modes of presentation of objects (individuals, properties), is that they are fine-grained items, so fine-grained that even synonymous sentences might express different Fregean propositions. My starting point is the principle labelled by Gareth Evans the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts, which states that it is impossible coherently to take different mental attitudes to the same proposition. As a logical truth (a consequence of Leibnizs Law), this is a synchronic principle, the application of which is restricted to attitudes held at a single time. I argue that such a restriction might be reasonably lifted and, on the basis of an adequate notion of attitude-retention, I propose an admissible diachronic extension of the principle.'
altloc:
- http://www.terravista.pt/Ancora/2558/boston.html
chapter: ~
commentary: ~
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confdates: '10-16 August, 1998'
conference: 'Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol 6: Analyic Philosophy and Logic'
confloc: Boston
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creators_id: []
creators_name:
- family: Branquinho
given: Joćo
honourific: ''
lineage: ''
date: 2000
date_type: published
datestamp: 2000-04-05
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dir: disk0/00/00/04/05
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editors_id: []
editors_name:
- family: Kanamori
given: Akihiro
honourific: ''
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eprint_status: archive
eprintid: 405
fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/405/1/Boston.htm
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keywords: 'proposition, thought, propositional attitudes, mental state, rationality, belief, cognitive dynamics, propositionalmemory, mental content, diachronic identity, mental tokensand types'
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:53:53
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metadata_visibility: show
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pagerange: 1-11
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publisher: 'Philosophy Documentation Centre, Bowling Green, Ohio'
refereed: FALSE
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rev_number: 8
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status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:27:23
subjects:
- phil-lang
- phil-mind
succeeds: ~
suggestions: ~
sword_depositor: ~
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thesistype: ~
title: On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions
type: confpaper
userid: 314
volume: ~