@misc{cogprints4748,
          volume = {2006},
          editor = {Prof. Dr. Shaun Gallagher},
           title = {'Reflexive Monism' versus 'Complementarism': An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's 'reflexive model' of consciousness},
          author = {Prof. em. Dr. Hans-Ulrich Hoche},
       publisher = {Springer},
            year = {2006},
         journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
        keywords = {Consciousness, mind-body problem, complementarity, dual-aspect theory, phenomenology, psychophysical causation, pure noematics, reflexive monism, Velmans.
},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/4748/},
        abstract = {From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ?phenomenon? in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans?s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans?s ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.
}
}

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