TY  - INPR
ID  - cogprints4748
UR  - http://cogprints.org/4748/
A1  - Hoche, Prof. em. Dr. Hans-Ulrich
Y1  - 2006///
N2  - From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ?phenomenon? in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans?s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans?s ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.

PB  - Springer
KW  - Consciousness
KW  -  mind-body problem
KW  -  complementarity
KW  -  dual-aspect theory
KW  -  phenomenology
KW  -  psychophysical causation
KW  -  pure noematics
KW  -  reflexive monism
KW  -  Velmans.

TI  - 'Reflexive Monism' versus 'Complementarism': An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's 'reflexive model' of consciousness
AV  - public
ER  -

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