@misc{cogprints4786,
           month = {March},
           title = {How qualia can be physical},
          author = {Mr Dennis Nicholson},
            year = {2006},
        keywords = {qualia, mind-body problem, identity theory, hard problem, knowledge argument},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/4786/},
        abstract = {Assume that a quale as we experience it is a perspective on an underlying physical state, rather than the physical state as such ? the reality as known as distinct from the reality as such. Assume, further, that this inner perspective is integral to, and materially co-extensive with, the physical state itself. Assume, finally, that the physical state in question is known as a brain state of a particular kind by an external observer of the brain in which it occurs. The result is a perspective in which a quale is entirely physical; a position that resolves several known difficulties for physicalism, including those associated with the explanatory gap, Jackson?s knowledge argument, and Chalmers? hard problem of consciousness.}
}

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