TY  - GEN
ID  - cogprints4786
UR  - http://cogprints.org/4786/
A1  - Nicholson, Mr Dennis
TI  - How qualia can be physical
Y1  - 2006/03//
N2  - Assume that a quale as we experience it is a perspective on an underlying physical state, rather than the physical state as such ? the reality as known as distinct from the reality as such. Assume, further, that this inner perspective is integral to, and materially co-extensive with, the physical state itself. Assume, finally, that the physical state in question is known as a brain state of a particular kind by an external observer of the brain in which it occurs. The result is a perspective in which a quale is entirely physical; a position that resolves several known difficulties for physicalism, including those associated with the explanatory gap, Jackson?s knowledge argument, and Chalmers? hard problem of consciousness.
AV  - public
KW  - qualia
KW  -  mind-body problem
KW  -  identity theory
KW  -  hard problem
KW  -  knowledge argument
ER  -

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