creators_name: Nicholson, Dennis
type: preprint
datestamp: 2006-03-18
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:56:22
metadata_visibility: show
title: How qualia can be physical
subjects: phil-mind
full_text_status: public
keywords: qualia, mind-body problem, identity theory, hard problem, knowledge argument
abstract: Assume that a quale as we experience it is a perspective on an underlying physical state, rather than the physical state as such – the reality as known as distinct from the reality as such. Assume, further, that this inner perspective is integral to, and materially co-extensive with, the physical state itself. Assume, finally, that the physical state in question is known as a brain state of a particular kind by an external observer of the brain in which it occurs. The result is a perspective in which a quale is entirely physical; a position that resolves several known difficulties for physicalism, including those associated with the explanatory gap, Jackson’s knowledge argument, and Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness.
date: 2006-03
date_type: published
refereed: FALSE
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citation:   Nicholson, Mr Dennis  (2006) How qualia can be physical.  [Preprint]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/4786/1/HQCBPcoghtml.htm