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abstract: "The basic philosophy of mainstream biology, the philosophy of materialist realism, assumes the existence of a material world independent of human observation and cognition. The scientific study of cognition in the context of biological evolution (CE) has, however, led to the result, that all our thoughts and cognitions, including the assumption of a material world, are dependent on our cognitive apparatus in its present stage of evolution. I think, this result is in contradiction with the materialist philosophy, and I therefore find, it is impossible to make a contradiction-free account of CE based on this philosophy. An account of natural science, biological evolution, and CE based on an idealist philosophy is offered, and it is argued that this account is free of contradictions. In the idealist philosophy \"material objects\" are regarded as concepts based on sensory experiences.\n"
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date: 2006-03
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keywords: 'Evolutionary epistemology, idealist philosophy, materialist realism, idealist ontology, psychological Now.'
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:56:23
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referencetext: |-
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rev_number: 8
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status_changed: 2007-09-12 17:02:47
subjects:
- bio-evo
- phil-epist
succeeds: 3373
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title: |-
Cognition and Biological Evolution
An Approach from Idealist Philosophy Resolves a Fundamental Paradox
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