--- abstract: 'A "machine" is any causal physical system, hence we are machines, hence machines can be conscious. The question is: which kinds of machines can be conscious? Chances are that robots that can pass the Turing Test -- completely indistinguishable from us in their behavioral capacities -- can be conscious (i.e. feel), but we can never be sure (because of the "other-minds" problem). And we can never know HOW they have minds, because of the "mind/body" problem. We can only know how they pass the Turing Test, but not how, why or whether that makes them feel.' altloc: - http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/machine.htm - http://lifeboat.com/ex/can.a.machine.be.conscious chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: - 63 creators_name: - family: Harnad given: Stevan honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 2003 date_type: published datestamp: 2006-12-22 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/53/30 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: 0 edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 5330 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/5330/1/machine.html full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'artificial intelligence, consciousness, Turing Test, mind/body problem, other-mind problem, artificial life' lastmod: 2015-11-19 23:48:54 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: 4-5 pagerange: 69-75 pubdom: FALSE publication: Journal of Consciousness Studies publisher: ~ refereed: TRUE referencetext: "Baron-Cohen, S. 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Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development, and simulation of everyday mindreading . Oxford: Blackwell." relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 12 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 17:09:11 subjects: - neuro-mod - cog-psy - phil-mind - comp-sci-robot - bio-theory succeeds: 2460 suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: "Can a machine be conscious? How?\r\n" type: journalp userid: 63 volume: 10