---
abstract: 'A "machine" is any causal physical system, hence we are machines, hence machines can be conscious. The question is: which kinds of machines can be conscious? Chances are that robots that can pass the Turing Test -- completely indistinguishable from us in their behavioral capacities -- can be conscious (i.e. feel), but we can never be sure (because of the "other-minds" problem). And we can never know HOW they have minds, because of the "mind/body" problem. We can only know how they pass the Turing Test, but not how, why or whether that makes them feel.'
altloc:
- http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/machine.htm
- http://lifeboat.com/ex/can.a.machine.be.conscious
chapter: ~
commentary: ~
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conference: ~
confloc: ~
contact_email: ~
creators_id:
- 63
creators_name:
- family: Harnad
given: Stevan
honourific: ''
lineage: ''
date: 2003
date_type: published
datestamp: 2006-12-22
department: ~
dir: disk0/00/00/53/30
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editors_id: []
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eprint_status: archive
eprintid: 5330
fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/5330/1/machine.html
full_text_status: public
importid: ~
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isbn: ~
ispublished: pub
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item_issues_comment: []
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keywords: 'artificial intelligence, consciousness, Turing Test, mind/body problem, other-mind problem, artificial life'
lastmod: 2015-11-19 23:48:54
latitude: ~
longitude: ~
metadata_visibility: show
note: ~
number: 4-5
pagerange: 69-75
pubdom: FALSE
publication: Journal of Consciousness Studies
publisher: ~
refereed: TRUE
referencetext: "Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: an essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.\r\n\r\nCangelosi, A. & Harnad, S. (2001) The Adaptive Advantage of Symbolic Theft Over Sensorimotor Toil:Grounding Language in Perceptual Categories. Evolution of Communication 4(1) 117-142\r\nhttp://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/20/36/index.html\r\n\r\nCangelosi A., Greco A. & Harnad S. (2000). From robotic toil to symbolic theft: Grounding transfer from entry-level to higher-level categories. Connection Science12(2):143-162 http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/47/index.html\r\n\r\n \r\nHarnad, S. (1982) Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory 5: 29 - 47. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/70/index.html\r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1990) The Symbol Grounding Problem Physica D 42: 335-346. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/06/15/index.html\r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1991) \"Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem\"Minds and Machines 1: 43-54.\r\nhttp://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/78/index.html\r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1992) The Turing Test Is Not A Trick: Turing Indistinguishability Is A Scientific Criterion. SIGART Bulletin 3(4) (October1992) pp. 9 - 10.\r\nhttp://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/84/index.html\r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (1994) Levels of Functional Equivalence in Reverse Bioengineering: The Darwinian Turing Test for Artificial Life. Artificial Life\r\n\r\n1(3): 293-301. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/91/index.html\r\n\r\nHarnad, Stevan (1995) \"Why and How We Are Not Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:164-167 http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/01/index.html\r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (2000) Minds, Machines, and Turing: The Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9(4): 425-445. (special issue on \"Alan Turing and Artificial Intelligence\") http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/16/index.html\r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (2001) No Easy Way Out. The Sciences 41(2) 36-42. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/24/index.html\r\n\r\nHarnad, S. (2002) Turing Indistinguishability and the Blind Watchmaker. In: J. Fetzer (ed.) Evolving Consciousness Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Pp 3-18 http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/15/index.html\r\n\r\nPremack, D. & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 4, 515-526.\r\n\r\nShear, J. (Ed.) (1997) Explaining consciousness : the \"hard problem.\" Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1997.\r\n\r\nTuring, A. M. (1950) Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind 49:433-460. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/99/index.html\r\n\r\nWhiten, A. (Ed.) (1991). Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development, and simulation of everyday mindreading . Oxford: Blackwell."
relation_type: []
relation_uri: []
reportno: ~
rev_number: 12
series: ~
source: ~
status_changed: 2007-09-12 17:09:11
subjects:
- neuro-mod
- cog-psy
- phil-mind
- comp-sci-robot
- bio-theory
succeeds: 2460
suggestions: ~
sword_depositor: ~
sword_slug: ~
thesistype: ~
title: "Can a machine be conscious? How?\r\n"
type: journalp
userid: 63
volume: 10