?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.title=The+Cost+of+Rational+Agency&rft.creator=Moss%2C+Scott&rft.subject=Artificial+Intelligence&rft.subject=Dynamical+Systems&rft.subject=Machine+Learning&rft.subject=Philosophy+of+Science&rft.subject=Social+Psychology&rft.description=The+rational+agency+assumption+limits+systems+to+domains+of+application+that+have+never+been+observed.+Moreover%2C+representing+agents+as+being+rational+in+the+sense+of+maximising+utility+subject+to+some+well+specified+constraints+renders+software+systems+virtually+unscalable.+These+properties+of+the+rational+agency+assumption+are+shown+to+be+unnecessary+in+representations+or+analogies+of+markets.+The+demonstration+starts+with+an+analysis+of+how+the+rational+agency+assumption+limits+the+applicability+and+scalability+of+the+IBM+information+filetering+economy.+An+unrestricted+specification+of+the+information+filtering+economy+is+developed+from+an+analysis+of+the+properties+of+markets+as+systems+and+the+implementation+of+a+model+based+on+intelligent+agents.+This+extended+information+filtering+economy+modelis+used+to+test+the+analytical+results+on+the+scope+for+agents+to+act+as+intermediaries+between+human+users+and+information+sources.&rft.date=1999-04&rft.type=Departmental+Technical+Report&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.identifier=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F534%2F3%2Frat-ag2a.pdf&rft.identifier=++Moss%2C+Scott++(1999)+The+Cost+of+Rational+Agency.++%5BDepartmental+Technical+Report%5D+++++&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Fcogprints.org%2F534%2F