@misc{cogprints594,
          volume = {14},
          number = {4},
          author = {Max Velmans},
           title = {Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective},
       publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
         journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
           pages = {702--719},
            year = {1991},
        keywords = {attention, complementarity, consciousness, functionalism, epiphenomenalism, information processing, mind, unconscious, first person, third person, ontological monism, epistemological dualism},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/594/},
        abstract = {The sequence of topics in this reply roughly follows that of the target article. The latter focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output. The discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reverse this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, does the reply. }
}

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