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--- abstract: "The “explanatory gap” is proposed to be the “hard problem” of\r\nconsciousness research and has generated a great deal of recent\r\ndebate.\r\nArguments brought forward to reveal this gap include the\r\nconceivability of zombies or the “super-neuroscientist” Mary. These\r\nare supposed to show that the facts of consciousness are not a priori\r\nentailed by the microphysical facts.\r\nSimilar arguments were already proposed by emergence theories in\r\nthe context of the debate between mechanism and vitalism.\r\nAccording to synchronic emergentism, the property of a system is\r\nemergent, when it cannot - in principle - be deduced from a complete\r\ndescription of the system’s components.\r\nHere, I argue that apart from phenomenal properties there are many\r\nother properties that, even though they are clearly physical, are not\r\nreductively explainable either. The explanatory gap of consciousness\r\nis therefore only a part of a much more general problem." altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: June 23-26 conference: 'ASSC-10 ' confloc: 'Oxford, UK' contact_email: ~ creators_id: - kmusholt@gmail.com creators_name: - family: Musholt given: Kristina honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 2005-06 date_type: published datestamp: 2008-04-24 16:38:23 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/60/18 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 6018 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/6018/1/EmergenzASSC10final.pdf full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: unpub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'emergence, consciousness, qualia, explanatory gap, hard problem, reductive explanation, pragmatism' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:57:06 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: ~ pubdom: TRUE publication: ~ publisher: ~ refereed: FALSE referencetext: "1. Aristoteles. Philosophische Schriften in sechs Bänden. Hamburg:Meiner.\r\n2. Block, N. and Stalnaker, R. (1999) Conceptual analysis, dualism and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Review\r\n3. Broad, C.D. (1925) The mind and its place in nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.\r\n4. Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. New York: Oxford University Press.\r\n5. Dennett, D.C. (1991). Real patterns. The Journal of Philosophy, 88, 27-51.\r\n6. El-Hani, C.N. and Pihlström, S. (2002). Emergence theories and pragmatic realism. Essays in Philosophy, 3, 1-40.\r\n7. Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127-136\r\n8. Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap.Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354-361\r\n9. Levine, J. (1993). On leaving out what it’s like. In: Davies and Humphreys (1993)\r\n10.Ros, A. (2005). Materie und Geist. Paderborn: Mentis\r\n11.Van Gulick, R. (1992). Nonreductive Materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. In: Beckermann, Flohr, Kim. New York: De Gruyter.\r\n12.Wittgenstein, L. Philosophische Untersuchungen; Das blaue Buch; Über Gewissheit. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp (1984)" relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 25 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2008-04-24 16:38:23 subjects: - phil-mind succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: Emergentism revisited type: confposter userid: 7762 volume: ~