TY  - GEN
ID  - cogprints6103
UR  - http://cogprints.org/6103/
A1  - Velmans, Prof Max
Y1  - 2008///
N2  - Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming ?out-thereness? of the phenomenal world and to how the ?phenomenal world? relates to the ?physical world?, the ?world itself?, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by ?transparency theory? and by ?biological naturalism?. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense.
PB  - Imprint Academic
KW  - Consciousness
KW  -  reflexive
KW  -  monism
KW  -  dualism
KW  -  reductionism
KW  -  physicalism
KW  -  functionalism
KW  -  transparency
KW  -  biological naturalism
KW  -  phenomenal world
KW  -  physical world
KW  -  world itself
KW  -  universe itself
KW  -  brain
KW  -  perceptual projection
KW  -  phenomenal space
KW  -  measured space
KW  -  physical space
KW  -  space perception
KW  -  information
KW  -  virtual reality
KW  -  hologram
KW  -  phenomenological internalism
KW  -  phenomenological externalism
KW  -  first person
KW  -  third person
KW  -  complementary
TI  - Reflexive Monism
SP  - 5
AV  - public
EP  - 50
ER  -

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