--- abstract: 'Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense.' altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: - m.velmans@gold.ac.uk creators_name: - family: Velmans given: Max honourific: Prof lineage: '' date: 2008 date_type: published datestamp: 2008-06-27 01:40:29 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/61/03 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 6103 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/6103/1/Reflexive_Monism_final_version_December_2007.pdf full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'Consciousness, reflexive, monism, dualism, reductionism, physicalism, functionalism, transparency, biological naturalism, phenomenal world, physical world, world itself, universe itself, brain, perceptual projection, phenomenal space, measured space, physical space, space perception, information, virtual reality, hologram, phenomenological internalism, phenomenological externalism, first person, third person, complementary' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:57:08 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: 2 pagerange: 5-50 pubdom: TRUE publication: 'Journal of Consciousness Studies ' publisher: Imprint Academic refereed: TRUE referencetext: "Baars, B.J. 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Oxford: Blackwell, pp 580-588.\r\n\r\n" relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 33 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2008-06-27 01:40:29 subjects: - phil-mind - phil-sci - phil-epist - phil-metaphys - percep-cog-psy succeeds: ~ suggestions: this version of the paper simply adds publication details to the prepublication version. suggest removing the prepublication version sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: Reflexive Monism type: journalp userid: 156 volume: 15