@unpublished{cogprints6173,
           title = {Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure?},
          author = {Chuck  Stieg},
            year = {2004},
        keywords = {Consciousness, Evolutionary Psychology, Function, Complexity},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/6173/},
        abstract = {Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread.  This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness.  Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity.  I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system.  It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.}
}

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