title: Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? creator: Stieg, Chuck subject: Philosophy of Mind subject: Epistemology subject: Philosophy of Science subject: Cognitive Psychology subject: Metaphysics subject: Evolutionary Psychology description: Evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena have become widespread. This paper examines a recent attempt by Nichols and Grantham (2000) to circumvent the problem of epiphenomenalism in establishing the selective status of consciousness. Nichols and Grantham (2000) argue that a case can be made for the view that consciousness is an adaptation based on its complexity. I set out this argument and argue that it fails to establish that phenomenal consciousness is a complex system. It is suggested that the goal of establishing consciousness as an adaptation may be better served by rejecting the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. date: 2004 type: Other type: NonPeerReviewed format: other identifier: http://cogprints.org/6173/1/PConsciousness%26ComplexitysubmitPhenom%26CogSci2.doc format: application/pdf identifier: http://cogprints.org/6173/2/PConsciousness%26ComplexitysubmitPhenom%26CogSci2.pdf identifier: Stieg, Chuck (2004) Is Phenomenal Consciousness a Complex Structure? (Unpublished) relation: http://cogprints.org/6173/