creators_name: Franceschi, Paul
creators_id: p;franceschi@univ-corse.fr
type: preprint
datestamp: 2009-07-02 01:52:41
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:57:22
metadata_visibility: show
title: A characterization of the one-sidedness fallacy within the framework of the cognitive distortions
subjects: phil-logic
subjects: cog-psy
full_text_status: public
keywords: one-sidedness fallacy, cognitive distortion, confirmation bias
abstract: In this paper, I propose an accurate description of the cognitive process involved in the one-sidedness fallacy, a widespread type of fallacy. I describe first several characterizations of the one-sidedness fallacy, that are either inductive or deductive, or occurring at a meta-philosophical level. I recall, second, the framework of the cognitive distortions described in Franceschi (2007). I give then a definition of the one-sidedness fallacy, by describing it as a general cognitive distortion: the disqualification of one pole. I show finally how the one-sidedness fallacy distinguishes itself from the confirmation bias.
date: 2009-06-13
date_type: completed
refereed: FALSE
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citation:   Franceschi, Dr Paul  (2009) A characterization of the one-sidedness fallacy within the framework of the cognitive distortions.  [Preprint]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/6547/1/osf-en.pdf