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--- abstract: 'In this paper, I propose an accurate description of the cognitive process involved in the one-sidedness fallacy, a widespread type of fallacy. I describe first several characterizations of the one-sidedness fallacy, that are either inductive or deductive, or occurring at a meta-philosophical level. I recall, second, the framework of the cognitive distortions described in Franceschi (2007). I give then a definition of the one-sidedness fallacy, by describing it as a general cognitive distortion: the disqualification of one pole. I show finally how the one-sidedness fallacy distinguishes itself from the confirmation bias.' altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: - p;franceschi@univ-corse.fr creators_name: - family: Franceschi given: Paul honourific: Dr lineage: '' date: 2009-06-13 date_type: completed datestamp: 2009-07-02 01:52:41 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/65/47 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 6547 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/6547/1/osf%2Den.pdf full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: ~ issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'one-sidedness fallacy, cognitive distortion, confirmation bias' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:57:22 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: ~ pubdom: FALSE publication: ~ publisher: ~ refereed: FALSE referencetext: "Bacon, F. (1939). Novum organum. Dans Burtt, E. A. (Ed.). The English philosophers from Bacon to Mill (pp. 24-123). New York: Random House. Original publication in 1620.\r\nBoulanger, P. (2000). Culture et nature. Pour la Science, 273, 3.\r\nChalmers, D. (2002). The St. Petersburg two-envelope paradox. Analysis, 62, 155-157.\r\nDietl, P. (1973). The Surprise Examination. Educational Theory, 23, 153-158.\r\nFranceschi, P. (2005). Une analyse dichotomique du paradoxe de l’examen-surprise. Philosophiques; 32-2, 399-421.\r\nFranceschi, P. (2007). Compléments pour une théorie des distorsions cognitives. Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 17-2, 84-88. Preprint in English: http://www.cogprints.org/5261/\r\nHall, N. (1999). How to Set a Surprise Exam. Mind, 108, 647-703.\r\nNickerson, R. S. (1998) Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2-2 , 175-220.\r\nQuine, W.V.O. (1953). On a So-called Paradox. Mind, 62, 65-66.\r\nSmith, J. W. (1984). The surprise examination on the paradox of the heap. Philosophical Papers, 13, 43-56.\r\nStuart Mill, John (1859). On Liberty, London. Original publication in 1859.\r\nSuber, E. (1998) The One-Sidedness Fallacy. Manuscript, http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/inflogic/onesided.htm.\r\nWilliamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. London & New York : Routledge." relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 27 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2009-07-02 01:52:41 subjects: - phil-logic - cog-psy succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: A characterization of the one-sidedness fallacy within the framework of the cognitive distortions type: preprint userid: 2943 volume: ~